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This paper is concerned with a policy oriented macroeconomic experiment involving an 
‘international’ economy with a relatively small ‘home’ country and a large ‘foreign’ country. 
It compares the economic performance of two alternative tax systems as a means to finance 
unemployment benefits: a sales-tax-cum-labor-subsidy system versus a wage tax system. The 
two systems are applied to the home country, while the wage tax system always obtains in the 
foreign country. In stark contrast with expectations of experts the sales tax system clearly 
outperforms the wage tax system, using standard economic indicators. It is argued that 
producers' reluctance to incur costs up-front while being uncertain about product prices can 
explain this outcome. Several pieces of evidence are provided to support this claim. The 
results strongly suggest that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account also in applied 
macroeconomic models. 
JEL Classification: A10, C90, C91, E21, D80, E62, H20. 






University of Amsterdam 
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics 
CREED 
Roetersstraat 11 
NL-1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
a.m.riedl@uva.nl 
Frans van Winden 
Tinbergen Institute 
University of Amsterdam 
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics 
CREED 
Roetersstraat 11 





This paper uses data generated by a research project commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, see van Winden, Riedl, Wit, and van Dijk (1999). Financial support by the Ministry and comments 
and suggestions by its Steering Committee are gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Frans van Dijk 
and Jörgen Wit who were both involved in the experimental design of the project, and, in addition, Jörgen Wit 
for the computation of the equilibria of the theoretical model used. Our gratitude furthermore goes to Jos 
Theelen for the development of the excellent software used in the experiment, and to G. Cotteleer, J.H.H. 
Notmijer, and M. Smits for their assistance in running the experiments. Former versions of this paper have been 
presented at conferences, workshops and seminars in Amsterdam, Barcelona, Bari, Berlin, Bonn, Frankfurt, 
Groningen, Lake Tahoe, Munich, New York, Rhodos, St. Gallen, The Hague, Venice, Zurich. We thank the 
participants for their helpful remarks. We are in particular grateful to Kurt Hildenbrand, Ruud de Mooij, Charles 
Noussair, Raymond Riezman, Shyam Sunder, and Claus Weddepohl for their valuable comments. This paper is 
part of the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT-98-0238). The usual disclaimer applies. 
 1 Introduction
Time usually elapses (...) between the incurring of costs by the producer
(with the consumer in view) and the purchase of the output by the ultimate
consumer. Meanwhile the entrepreneur (...) has to form the best expecta-
tions he can as to what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is
ready to supply them (...).
John Maynard Keynes (1970 [1936], Ch. 5: Expectation as Determining
Output and Employment, p. 46)
A major economic issue concerns the eects of taxation on the behavior of individual
consumers and producers and the performance of markets. In this context, a long-
standing problem relates to the pros and cons of taxing inputs, e.g. labor and capital,
versus the taxation of outputs, like sales or value added. One potentially highly rele-
vant factor in this respect is that production takes time, a fact emphasized by Keynes
in the preceding quote. When input decisions have to be taken, typically, uncertainty
exists about the real returns following from these decisions. This is because at the
time producers have to decide on the input of labor and capital the precise market
conditions that will prevail at the time consumers buy their products are unknown. A
similar problem holds for consumers when they have to allocate time between labor
and leisure, because the real return on their labor will depend on the development of
consumer prices over the period covered by the wage contract.
Several studies have argued that taking this uncertainty into account is important
from a behavioral explanatory and optimal policy point of view. For example, Eaton
and Rosen (1980) show that if consumers are uncertain about the real wage, an ex-
pected income-compensated increase in the wage tax may induce them to supply more
labor. Moreover, lump-sum taxation is no longer necessarily ecient, because the wage
tax insures the consumer against random real wage income movements. Regarding pro-
ducers, a number of partial equilibrium studies have focused on the eects of output
price uncertainty on the supply and input decisions of rms. Results show that output
price uncertainty may reduce the factor demand and production level of risk-averse
competitive rms (Sandmo (1971), Batra and Ullah (1974), Hartman (1975, 1976),
Holthausen (1976), Ghosal (1995)).1 This research suggests that shifting taxation from
1Loss aversion, as in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), would seem to make this
eect only stronger. Another strand of literature addresses the impact of (macroeconomic) uncertainty
1inputs to outputs may have a positive eect on production and employment because
the government then eectively shares the risk faced by producers.
The policy relevance of this topic can be illustrated by referring to \the puzzle of
European unemployment" (Blanchard and Katz (1997)). A large piece of this puzzle
seems related to the strong reliance on wage taxation in nancing the welfare state, and
the focus on supply side conditions in employment policies. Indeed, several scholars
have pointed at the pernicious eects of wage taxation in this respect, with rising tax
rates and unemployment leading to a vicious circle (Snower (2000)). However, it is
not at all clear whether shifting taxation to outputs would do any better. In fact,
since value added taxes or sales taxation would imply an implicit tax on capital, one
might expect negative eects on employment due to capital ight. From a more general
perspective, the issue regarding the economic eects of shifting taxation from inputs
to outputs is much wider, though. It not only involves the employment of labor and
capital, but also the budget balance and other economic indicators, like real GDP and
consumer welfare in general. To shed light on this ultimately empirical issue motivates
this paper.
Another motivation relates to the novelty of the research method. For our inves-
tigation we use data from an experimental study pitting a wage tax system against a
sales tax system as alternative means to nance unemployment benets, commissioned
by the Dutch Ministry of Social Aairs and Employment.2 The Minister was requested
to do so in a motion carried by the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament. To
our knowledge, it is for the rst time that policymakers explicitly asked for laboratory
experimentation as a means to advise in macroeconomic policymaking.
Because of the implicit tax on capital, the general opinion of policymakers and
economic policy advisers was that the sales tax system would lead to capital ight,
more unemployment, and a substantial welfare loss in a relatively small open economy,
like The Netherlands. In addition, it was feared that a shift in economic activity would
take place from the relatively capital intensive `exposed sector' (producing tradeable
goods) towards the more labor intensive `sheltered sector'. The more so, because high
tax rates were foreseen due to a labor subsidy that was incorporated in the alternative
sales tax system.
on investment, typically showing a negative eect (Aizenman and Marion (1993), Brunetti and Weder
(1998), Guiso and Parigi (1999)).
2See van Winden, Riedl, Wit, and van Dijk (1999).
2Being a policy-oriented study, the experimental design was required to show some
parallelism with the Dutch economy. A steering committee, to which economists with
an international reputation in relevant elds of research (public economics, labor eco-
nomics, experimental economics and applied general equilibrium modelling) were as-
signed, had to approve the design and assist the project.
Other innovative aspects of our study concern the comparison of dierent tax sys-
tems in a macroeconomic experiment, and the implementation of a relatively small
`home' economy and a large `foreign' economy in the laboratory.3 In a sense, doing
this study meant exploring the boundaries of the research method of laboratory exper-
imentation. The results show that also in this area of policy related macroeconomic
research experiments are a useful complementary research tool, next to theoretical and
eld empirical analyses. Compared to eld econometric studies an important advantage
is that it is possible to empirically analyze the economic consequences of a complete
implementation of a new tax system. With the additional virtue of being able to do
so in a controlled way. Furthermore, an experiment oers the opportunity to generate
(and if necessary replicate) the micro-level data of interest and avoids the noise eld
data are unavoidably exposed to.4 In addition, no specic behavioral assumptions are
needed, nor a restriction to a partial equilibrium framework as in the theoretical studies
referred to above. Moreover, since theory generically predicts multiple equilibria, ex-
periments can provide information on their relative attractiveness in practice; an issue
that will also show up in our study.
More specically, the experimental international economy that we will investigate
consists of two `countries', one of which - the home country - is relatively small in terms
of potential economic activity. In each country consumers and producers are active.
Consumers supply labor and capital to producers on local and global input markets.
In both countries, producers are distributed over two production sectors: a sheltered
sector producing a relatively labor intensive commodity for a local output market, and
an exposed sector producing a relatively capital intensive commodity for a global output
market. All production factors and consumption goods are traded through multi-unit
double auctions.5 In the benchmark experimental treatment, in both countries, a wage
3Akerlof (2002) discusses some other recent experiments related to macroeconomic issues.
4In empirical studies of taxation this is a notorious problem which, for example, manifests itself in
widely diverging estimates of tax rate elasticities (see e.g. Srensen (1997)).
5Double auctions are typically used for their capability to facilitate the equilibration of supply and
demand and the generation of ecient outcomes (see e.g. Davis and Holt (1993)).
3tax nances the benets consumers receive for unemployed labor. In the alternative
treatment, the wage tax system is substituted by a sales tax system, in the home
country only. Under this system, instead of having to pay a tax on labor up-front, a
producer is taxed according to the proceeds from sales. Moreover, for each employed
unit of labor the producer receives a subsidy equal to the unemployment benet.
To evaluate the performance of the two tax systems we use the following economic
indicators: employment of labor, net capital export, shift towards labor intensive pro-
duction, real GDP, consumer earnings, and the budget surplus. Our main ndings
are the following. First, despite of the rather complicated experimental environment,
we observe a clear tendency towards equilibration of the economic process. Second, it
turns out that the wage tax system shows persistent budget decits, while tax adjust-
ments to balance these decits have a strong negative impact on the employment of
labor and real GDP. Third, shifting taxation from wages to sales and subsidizing labor
in the home country has substantial positive budgetary and real economic eects for
this country. Moreover, there is no evidence of capital ight nor of a shift in economic
activity towards the labor intensive sector. In summary, the alternative sales-tax-cum-
labor-subsidy system performs signicantly better than the wage tax system.
To explain these ndings - which took our principals by surprise - we claim that
producers' aversion towards incurring costs up-front while facing output price uncer-
tainty plays a crucial role. The sales-tax-cum-labor-subsidy system is clearly much
more producer and employment friendly in this respect. Instead of having to pay a tax
on the input of labor, a subsidy is received, while through the sales tax the government
is sharing the risk the producer runs with respect to the return on output. We present
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that supports our claim.
Our results point at a hitherto underexposed behavioral regularity, with relevance
for economic model building as well as policy advising. Regarding the latter our study
ts into a still small but gradually growing stream of `design' studies which involve
the economist as `engineer' (Roth (2002)). In these studies experimental and compu-
tational economics are used as research methods lling the gap between theory and
design. For the development of theory these studies can be helpful by posing challenges
and suggesting some new answers to questions. However, as Roth notes: \Whether
economists will often be in a position to give highly practical advice on design depends
in part on whether we report what we learn, and what we do, in sucient detail to allow
4scientic knowledge about design to accumulate" (ibid., p. 1342). With our paper we
hope to make a contribution to this empirical feedback mechanism.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design and procedures. The experimental results are given in Section 3. In Section 4 we
propose a behavioral explanation for our main ndings, providing additional supportive
evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
In this section we rst describe the economic environment that we investigate in the
experiment. Then, we specify its implementation and the choice of parameters, followed
by a discussion of the research questions and experimental procedures. For convenience,
the wage tax system will be denoted as the WT-system and the alternative sales-tax-
cum-labor-subsidy system as the STLS-system.
2.1 Economic Environment
In view of the desired parallelism with a relatively small open economy, we consider
an `international' economy with consumers and producers in two `countries', a rela-
tively small country s, the home country, and a large country l, the foreign country.
Consumers are endowed with units of capital (K) and labor (L) that they can sell to
producers in a capital and a labor market. Consumers derive utility from `leisure', i.e.
unsold units of labor, and the consumption of two private goods: X and Y . In addi-
tion to factor payments, the consumption budget is determined by an unemployment
benet for each unsold unit of labor. Commodities X and Y are produced in separate
sectors. Producers need capital and labor as inputs, which are transformed to outputs
via given production technologies. The production of good X is relatively capital in-
tensive, while the production of Y is relative labor intensive. Prots are determined by
the dierence between sales revenue and the costs of inputs. The former may involve
sales taxes and the latter wage taxes or labor subsidies, depending on the prevailing
tax system. Taxes are paid for the nance of unemployment benets and/or labor
subsidies (see the next subsection). Both the capital market and the market for X are
international (exposed), while the markets for labor and good Y are local (sheltered).
Consequently, the total number of input and output markets equals six. Figure 1 shows











































































































Figure 1 { Flow diagram of the economic environment
2.2 Implementation and Choice of Parameters
Consumers are endowed with  K units of capital and  L units of labor. Preferences over
leisure ( L L) and the two consumption goods, X and Y , are induced by a log-linearized
Cobb-Douglas type of utility function.6 Producers are endowed with a CES production
technology allowing with decreasing returns to scale, dierent factor intensities, and
dierent elasticities of substitution in the two production sectors.7 In the upper part
of Table 1 the continuous approximations of the discrete utility (earnings) and output
tables used in the experiments are shown. The rest of this table will be discussed below.
All inputs and outputs are traded in computerized multiple unit double auction
markets (see Plott and Gray (1990)). The choice of this market type is guided by its rep-
6The use of a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas utility function has the advantage that subjects could
be provided with a simple sheet of paper showing the marginal and total payo for each of the three
arguments, even though three goods entered the utility function as variables.
7The actually implemented factor intensities and substitution elasticities resemble estimates for the
Dutch economy. The choice of (slightly) decreasing returns to scale is motivated by an empirical and
a methodological consideration. Firstly, empirical evidence exist supporting this choice (see Basu and
Fernald (1997)). Secondly, it allows experimental producers to make strictly positive prots, and hence
monetary earnings, in the theoretical benchmark equilibrium discussed below.
6Table 1 { Experimental parameters
Preferences and production technologies
Consumers i (utility functions):
Uik = 25

lnXik + lnYik + :25ln( Lik   Lik)

;
Uik = 0 if either Xik; Yik; or  Lik   Lik equals zero; k = s;l

in both tax systems
Quantities Lik, Yik are determined `locally' (within a country)
Quantities Xik are determined `internationally' (one global market)












z ; Z = X;Y ; z = x;y; k = s;l
Labor intensities : x = :5625; y = :675; Substitution elasticities : x =  2; y =  6
Scaling factor: As = 1 (small country); Al = 1:21 (large country)
jxk = pxXjxk   (1 + wk)wkLjxk   rKjxk;
jyk = pykYjyk   (1 + wk)wkLjyk   rKjyk; k = s;l

in WT-system
jxs = (1   xs)pxXjxs   (ws   w0)Ljxs   rKjxs;
jys = (1   ys)pysYjys   (ws   w0)Ljys   rKjys;
jxl = pxXjxl   (1 + wl)wlLjxl   rKjxl;





Prices pyk, wk, taxes wk, zs, and quantities Ljzk, Yjyk are determined `locally'
(within country k = s;l)
Prices px, r, and quantities Kjxk, Xjxk are determined `internationally'
(one global market)
Endowments (both tax systems)
Small country Large country
Consumer  Li = 15;  Ki = 10; Cashi = 181  Li = 105;  Ki = 70; Cashi = 1268
X-producer  Lj = 0;  Kj = 0; Cashj = 1223  Lj = 0;  Kj = 0; Cashj = 8557




Y -Producers 3 3
Tax systems
WT-system STLS-system
Both countries k Small country s Large country l
Unemployment benet (w0) 70 70 70
Labor subsidy (w0) 0 70 0
Initial wage tax rate (
0
















w ) w0( Lk   L
t
k) w0( Ll   L
t
l)
Initial sales tax rate X (
0
x) 0 :6521 0
Initial sales tax rate Y (
0



























Note: In the table describing the tax systems, t denotes a trading period, the variables Lt
k,  Lk, Xs, and Ys denote
aggregates in a country, superscripts 0 refer to initial values.
7utation of fast equilibration of supply and demand in experimental market economies.
Trading takes place in a number of trading periods. Each trading period is split into a
rst phase with only the input markets open, and a second phase with only the output
markets open.8 To facilitate trading, both consumers and producers are endowed with
some at money (cash) at the beginning of the rst phase of each period. In addition,
consumers receive a transfer (w0) for each unit of labor that is unemployed at the end
of this phase.9
All taxes are paid by the producers. In the baseline treatment of the experiment
the WT-system obtains in both countries. In this case a given tax rate (wk; k=s;l) is
applied to the wage of each unit of labor that is employed. In the treatment concerning
the alternative tax regime the WT-system again obtains in the large country, but now
the STLS-system prevails in the small (home) country. Instead of paying a wage tax,
producers in the small country now receive a xed subsidy (equal to the unemployment
benet) for each unit of labor they employ, while paying a given tax rate (xs in the
X-sector and ys in the Y -sector ) on the sales price of their products.10
Experimental subjects participate in a sequence of 16 trading periods. In the rst
half of each session these periods are all identical with respect to the exogenous pa-
rameters. Except for the subjects' earnings nothing carries over from period to period.
Consequently, each period can be seen as a repetition of the same static economy. In the
second half of a session (periods 9-16) tax rates are adjusted at the beginning of each
new period such that a balanced budget for unemployment benets would be obtained
for the previous period, given the market outcomes of that period. The initial tax rates
8The main reason for using sequential instead of simultaneous markets is the considerable reduction
of complexity for the subjects. Note, however, that even simultaneous markets would exhibit some
sequentiality, were it alone for the sequentiality that is inherent to the production process (cf. Keynes'
view quoted in the beginning). Since there is no clear experimental evidence that sequential markets
perform worse than simultaneous ones, we are condent that our results are not systematically in-
uenced by our choice (see e.g. Quirmbach, Swenson, and Vines (1996), but also Hey and di Cagno
(1998)).
9Any unemployment remaining in an equilibrium may be viewed as `voluntary', theoretically (ac-
cording to Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, p. 41) the question of voluntary versus involuntary
unemployment is `fruitless' for practical and public policy purposes). The inclusion of `frictions', like
trade unions or eciency wages, might have added some realism. However, in view of the already
complicated nature of the economy it was decided to start with a relative simple market structure.
Lian and Plott (1998) use a similar setup for their general equilibrium experiment.
10Because this study does not focus on transitional issues, a between-subjects design was chosen for
the tax systems. It also helped to avoid too lengthy sessions.
8and the tax adjustment rules are shown in the lower part of Table 1.11 This procedure
guarantees a sucient number of repetitions with a constant environment for making
it possible to examine whether economic behavior stabilizes. The adjustment of the
tax rates to the budget balance adds an important feature of realism and enables an
analysis of the dynamic interaction between taxation, employment and other indica-
tors of economic performance, while keeping everything else constant. It also allows to
control for the potentially confounding eect that a relative good performance of a tax
system is `bought' by budget decits.
Table 1 shows the parameter values chosen for the endowments, utility functions,
production functions, and the number of agents. To implement a large country in the
laboratory the following solution was chosen. While keeping the number of consumers
and producers the same for both countries, consumers in the large country are endowed
with seven times as many units of labor and capital as holds for the consumers in the
small country (see the dierent  L and  K in the table). Moreover, the scaling factor
(A) in the production functions is adjusted such that, according to the theoretical
benchmark model discussed next, in the control treatment supply and demand in the
large economy would be seven times as large as in the small economy.12
In order to get rationalizable initial tax rates and theoretical benchmark predictions
we used the numerical solution of a competitive general equilibrium model equating
supply and demand in the various markets under the requirement of a balanced tax-
transfer budget. We are thereby following other studies of experimental markets using
a similar procedure (see e.g. Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995, 1997), Quirmbach,
Swenson, and Vines (1996)). Table 2 presents the outcomes. Interestingly, there are
two quite dierent equilibria for the STLS-system.13 Equilibrium 2 shows the serious
negative economic consequences - including a substantial capital ight - for the small
11An upper bound of 0.90 was maintained for the tax rates because pilot studies showed that (par-
ticularly, sales) tax rates too close to 100% might have a strongly discouraging eect on trading.
12The alternative approach of increasing the number of agents instead of endowments would not
have been feasible. With the requirement of at least three agents on each side of a market to ensure
competitiveness (see Davis and Holt (1993), Huck, Konrad, M uller, and Normann (2001)), the minimal
number of subjects per experimental session would have been 64, exceeding by far the capacity of the
laboratory.
13Actually, the WT-system also shows two equilibria. Accidently, however, they are so close to be
virtually not distinguishable. Therefore, we report only one here. Although, generically, an odd number
of general equilibria exist (Dierker (1972)), instable equilibria are neither likely to be detected - which
explains the even number found - nor of practical interest, here.
9Table 2 { Theoretical benchmark predictions
WT-system STLS-system
equilibrium 1 equilibrium 2
Small country
Inputs:
Ks 30:0 28:0 11:5
Ls 28:2 33:0 18:2
Production:
Xs 22:2 24:8 13:7
Ys 18:9 20:9 11:0
Relative prices:

r :0307 :0295 :0289
ws :1694 :1971 :1292
px :1882 :1807 :1807
pys :2211 :2165 :2727
Tax rates:

wage tax ws :3777
sales tax xs :4889 :7835
sales tax ys :5414 :8677
Large country
Inputs:
Kl 210:0 212:0 228:5
Ll 197:4 199:2 213:3
Production:
Xl 155:1 156:5 167:8
Yl 132:0 132:9 140:4
Relative prices:

r :0307 :0295 :0289
wl :1694 :1640 :1743
px :1882 :1807 :1807
pyl :2211 :2123 :2121
Tax rates:

wage tax wl :3777 :3655 :2769
Note:  Relative prices are obtained through dividing nominal prices by
the sum of all (six) nominal prices;  these tax rates guarantee a balanced
budget in equilibrium.
country that were anticipated by policymakers and economic policy advisers. The
other equilibrium, however, shows substantial positive employment eects, little capital
ight, and an increase in the production of both sectors. These results suggest that,
theoretically at least, some benecial tax shifting is possible by switching from input
taxation to output taxation.
10In order to avoid a potential bias of the experimental results in favor of the alterna-
tive tax system, and because of the policy orientation of the experiment, it was decided
not to take the initial tax rates for the STLS-system from one of the two equilibria of
the theoretical model. Instead, these were determined such that on impact the pro-
ducers of X and Y would have to bear the same tax burden as empirically observed
(in the laboratory) under the WT-system.14 Finally, it is noted that only one currency
(`francs', with a xed conversion rate to Dutch guilders) is used in the lab economy.
Since the focus of this study is not on issues of international nance we did not want
to complicate the experiment by introducing multiple currencies.
2.3 Research Questions and Experimental Procedures
The main research question of this study concerns the economic performance of the
STLS-system in comparison with the WT-system in the small country. In light of
the implicit taxation of capital under the STLS-system, with capital being mobile and
labor immobile between countries, the general expectation of our principals was that a
serious capital ight with bad economic consequences would show up. To evaluate the
performance of the two tax systems the following economic indicators were selected,
with the expected eect of the STLS-system between parentheses: employment of labor
( ), net capital export (+), shift towards labor intensive production (+), real GDP
( ), consumer earnings ( ), and the budget surplus ( ).
All experimental sessions were run at the CREED-laboratory of the University of
Amsterdam in the Fall and Winter of 1998. Subjects, recruited through announcements
on bulletin boards, were undergraduates of the University and mostly coming from
its Faculty of Economics and Econometrics. Because the experimental environment is
rather complex, subjects had to to sign up for three meetings: a training session (where
participants got acquainted with the trading rules, forms and tables to be used, and how
to handle the computer), a `closed economy' session (for getting subjects experienced
with trading), and the international economy session.15 Subjects were paid out at the
14More precisely, the initial wage tax rate 
0
w which ceteris paribus balances actual average tax
revenue with actual average unemployment expenditure in the periods 6-8 of the WT-system (denoted
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ys. When the tax
rates are adjusted, in periods 9-16, the ratio of the tax rates is kept the same (see the lower part of
Table 1).
15Parameter values of the closed economy were similar but not identical to the ones used in the exper-
iment. Subjects were selected for the international economy session on the basis of their performance
(earnings) in the closed economy session; they got informed about this at the rst meeting.
11end of the third meeting. They received a show-up fee of 70 Dutch guilders for the
training session. In the closed economy sessions they earned on average 27 guilders,
while receiving 40 guilders.as a show-up fee. The show-up fee for the international
economy session was 10 guilders, while average earnings in this sessions amounted to
120 guilders (at the time of the experiments one Dutch guilder was worth approximately
0.52 U.S. dollar). All meetings lasted about 3.5 hours. At the training session each
subject was randomly assigned the role of consumer or producer, which they kept in
the subsequent meetings.
At the beginning of an experimental session subjects received instructions consist-
ing of a general part, read aloud by the experimenter, and a role-specic part, which
was quietly read by the subjects. They further received personal history forms with
all the information that was relevant to them (concerning endowments, markets they
were allowed to trade in, any taxes or subsidies, and the conversion rate of `francs'
to guilders).16 Similar information was provided on the computer screen. By having
them ll in their transactions and earnings these forms were also intended to make
subjects fully aware of the consequences of their decisions. Quizzes were used to check
the understanding of the procedures, the reading of the table with redemption val-
ues (`utility') or input-output combinations (production schedule), and the calculation
of earnings. A sample copy of the instructions, trading rules, and personal forms
used in the experiments can be downloaded from http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdf
les/instr2taxsyscomp.pdf.
Each experimental session started with two unpaid practice rounds, followed by 16
trading periods. During the rst eight periods tax rates were kept at their initial values.
From trading period 9 on, they adjusted to the budget balance of the previous period.
In each period, the input markets phase lasted 4 minutes and 30 seconds. Then, after
a short break of 20 seconds, the output markets phase started which lasted 3 minutes
and 30 seconds. This was followed by a 2 minutes break for recording before the next
period began.17
16In the experiment consumers were labeled `type-1 traders' and producers `type-2 traders'. More-
over, labor and capital were denoted as good V and good W, respectively. Markets were labeled as
V1(2), W1, X1, Y1(2). The unemployment benet was denoted as a subsidy for unsold units of V.
17Standing bids and asks were presented as `market prices' (excluding any taxes or subsidies) and as
`inclusive prices' (including taxes or subsidies). After the closing of the factor markets consumers were
informed about the transfers received for unsold units of labor, while producers were informed about
the number of goods produced with the inputs they bought. In addition, some market statistics were
provided concerning trades, average prices, and the average price subjects received (paid) for the inputs
they sold (bought). Similar market statistics were provided after the closing of the product markets.
12Two series of experimental sessions were conducted, each consisting of three ses-
sions. One series concerned the the treatment where the WT-system obtained in both
countries, while the other series dealt with the treatment where the STLS-system was
eective in the small country while the WT-system again prevailed in the large country.
Table 3 characterizes the sessions.
Table 3 { Summary of experiments
Number of Tax system Number of Number of
subjects in small country periods
y constant tax periods
session 1 16 WT 16 (2) 8
session 2 16 WT 16 (2) 8
session 3 16 WT 16 (2) 8
session 4 16 STLS 16 (2) 8
session 5 16 STLS 16 (2) 8
session 6 16 STLS 16 (2) 8
Note: y number of practice periods in parentheses.
3 Experimental Results
In presenting our results we will focus rst on the trading periods with a constant
tax regime (periods 1-8). Since the wage tax rates in the constant tax regime of
the WT-system are at the level of the theoretical benchmark predictions shown in
Table 2, we use the results of these periods for a comparison with these benchmark
predictions.18 However, the main focus will be on the economic indicators showing
the relative performance of the two tax systems. Recall that in the large country the
wage tax system is eective in both experimental treatments, the WT-system and the
STLS-system.
3.1 Constant Tax Regime
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the development of quantities (panels (a)) and relative prices
(panels (b)), averaged over sessions, for the WT-system and the STLS-system. In
this subsection we restrict our discussion to the left-hand part of each gure (the rst 8
periods). The gures show an orderly development, as is also observed in other multiple
18Recall that the initial tax rates in the STLS-system are determined by using the outcomes of the
constant tax regime of the WT-system.
13markets experiments. More interesting are the following observations. Notice from
Figure 2 (a) that, with only one exception, all quantities start below the equilibrium
levels of the theoretical benchmark model. Most of these variables, however, seem
to converge towards these levels. Regarding the development of prices, panel (b) of
Figure 2 exhibits no clear picture concerning the starting levels of the output prices,
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Figure 3 { Development of quantities and prices under the STLS-system
14This general impression is conrmed by a convergence analysis based on the follow-
ing estimation model (see Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995)):
yit = a11DA1(1=t) + a12DA2(1=t) + a13DA3(1=t) + a2DA(t   1)=t + uit
where y stands for the particular outcome focused at (quantity, price; with average
outcomes per period and session as units of observation ), i denotes the experimental
session, t the trading period in the session, DAi a dummy variable for session i of the
WT-system which is equal to 1 for i and 0 otherwise, and u the error term. Note that
the coecients a1i indicate the session specic starting values and a2 the asymptotic
value of y in the WT-system (DA = 1 when the WT-system is eective). Strong
convergence is said to hold if the estimated asymptotic value (a2) is not signicantly
dierent from the theoretical benchmark level, while weak convergence holds if, instead,
the majority of the starting values (a1i) are further apart from the theoretical level than
the estimated asymptotic value.
The regression results are presented in Table 4. They show that strong convergence
can be rejected for only 1 of the 12 variables. Moreover, weak convergence holds for
the not strongly converging relative price of capital. In our view this nding is quite
remarkable since the theoretical benchmark model is an extremely stylized representa-
tion of the experimental economy. Note, that the asymptotic value of all the quantity
variables is lower than the respective theoretical level. This is also the case for two of
the three input price variables, while for two of the three output price variables the
asymptote is higher than the theoretical value. This leads to our rst result.
Result 1 Almost all variables strongly convergence towards the equilibrium levels of
the theoretical benchmark model. The quantity and input price variables are typically
converging from below, while the output prices are typically converging from above.
We now turn to a comparison of the two tax systems in the constant tax regime.
Comparing Figure 2(a) with Figure 3(a) shows that economic activity starts at a lower
level in the experimental sessions with the STLS-system. This holds for the employment
of both input factors, and is accompanied by lower input prices. In particular, output
of the exposed sector is aected, while its product price exhibits a clear upward thrust.
In these periods, the small country is facing substantial sales taxes, with a tax rate
of 65% and 75% on the price of X and Y (see Table 1). Recall that these tax rates
are not taken from the theoretical benchmark model but determined in a way that on
impact the producers of X and Y would have to bear the same tax burden as observed
15Table 4 { Convergence regressions for constant wage tax regime
Comparison with theoretical benchmark model




K 231.05 208.67 229.36 237.88 240 0.6660 0.42
(78.56)
a (70.96) (77.99) (56.35)
X 199.03 139.54 173.34 172.16 177 0.8216 0.77
(12.08) (8.47) (10.52) (9.11)
r 0.0091 0.0142 0.0204 0.0148 0.0307 0.0122 0.24
(0.29) (0.45) (0.64) (0.45)
px 0.1722 0.2171 0.1721 0.1887 0.1882 0.9597 0.88
(27.83) (35.08) (27.81) (19.82)
Small country
Ls 27.892 26.297 30.608 26.893 28 0.8006 0.58
(217.10) (204.69) (238.24) (6.99)
Ys 15.952 14.066 19.010 14.420 19 0.1605 0.38
(7.63) (6.73) (9.09) (6.88)
ws 0.1931 0.1997 0.1743 0.1835 0.1694 0.1041 0.96
(68.99) (71.36) (62.26) (37.15)
pys 0.2361 0.2115 0.2528 0.2388 0.2211 0.2641 0.89
(41.00) (36.73) (43.90) (20.71)
Large country
Ll 181.19 175.96 190.61 188.96 197 0.6679 0.79
(31.14) (30.24) (32.76) (11.70)
Yl 106.89 130.74 118.68 119.33 132 0.3470 0.77
(17.28) (21.14) (19.19) (11.48)
wl 0.1743 0.1511 0.1492 0.1538 0.1694 0.2145 0.93
(23.64) (20.48) (20.23) (17.65)
pyl 0.2066 0.2170 0.2280 0.2208 0.2211 0.9864 0.81
(16.69) (17.53) (18.42) (15.59)
Note: Prais-Winsten regressions that are corrected for rst-order serially-correlated residuals
and robust standard errors, allowing for dependent observations within sessions. a t-values
in parentheses, b F-test testing the value of a2 against the theoretical prediction; all tests
two-sided. For X, Ys, and Yl the units consumed are used as unit of observation.
under the WT-system. Thus, the initial economic circumstances are not particularly
favorable for a comparatively good performance of the alternative tax system.
Our primary research questions concern the small country. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing we mainly, but not exclusively, focus on the economic performance of regarding
the small country under the two dierent tax regimes. Figures 4-6 illustrate the de-
velopment of the unemployment rate, the budget surplus, and real GDP, for both tax
systems (and both countries). Whereas, initially, the unemployment rate in the small
country is at a higher level in case of the STLS-system, Figure 4 shows that there is a





























































Figure 4 { Development of unemployment rates under the two tax sys-
tems
ment rate under the WT-system (and the development in the large country, where a
wage tax is applied in both treatments). This appears to have a benecial eect on the
budget surplus of the small country, which substantially increases over the periods (see
Figure 5). Wage taxes, on the other hand, are systematically accompanied by budget
decits; this holds for the baseline treatment (WT-system, small and large country)
as well as the alternative treatment (large country with wage tax system). A similar
picture emerges from the development of real GDP (see Figure 6). Whereas economic
activity strongly increases in the small country when the sales tax applies, it shows no
clear development, neither in the small country nor in the large country, when the wage
tax system is eective.
These observations are corroborated by a convergence analysis using an extension of
the estimation model presented above.19 Table 5 gives the results. Whereas the asymp-
totic estimates for the large country (b2 versus a2) still show the negative consequences
of the relatively adverse start in economic activity in these sessions, the outcomes for the
small country are quite dierent. Compared to the WT-system, we observe a clear de-
19The estimation model now becomes
yit = a11DA1(1=t) + a12DA2(1=t) + a13DA3(1=t) + a2DA(t   1)=t +
b11DB1(1=t) + b12DB2(1=t) + b13DB3(1=t) + b2DB(t   1)=t + uit
where DBi is a dummy variable representing session i of the STLS-system (equal to 1 for i, 0 oth-
erwise); DB = 1 for sessions where the STLS-system applies in the small country, zero otherwise.
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Figure 6 { Development of real GDP under the two tax systems
crease in the unemployment rate and a substantial improvement in the budget balance,
while the remaining variables are not signicantly dierent for the two tax regimes.
There is no shift in production between the sectors (measured by `Y -production inten-
sity'), while real GDP increases and net capital export decreases, though not signi-
cantly. Furthermore, although consumer earnings are somewhat smaller, this outcome
reverses into a large increase when adjusted for the budget surplus (consumer earnings
2). Both outcomes are only weakly signicant, however. These observations lead to
our next result.
18Table 5 { Convergence regressions for constant tax regime
Economic performance indicators compared between the tax systems




Unemploy- 0.3845 0.4709 0.2116 0.5270 0.5521 0.2667 0.4130 0.3227 0.0453 0.40
ment rate (28.37)
a (6.80) (2.24) (10.10) (7.03) (15.61) (21.70) (15.57)
Budget -0.1165 -0.0789 0.0406 0.0159 -0.0224 0.1045 -0.0843 0.2404 0.0085 0.45
surplus (-8.56) (-1.77) (1.36) (0.81) (-0.58) (6.64) (-1.38) (5.65)
Real GDP 14.881 13.857 24.068 15.336 14.349 22.327 20.092 21.783 0.3541 0.58
(9.54) (12.19) (9.56) (6.14) (5.99) (30.84) (22.33) (25.79)
Consumer 82.397 88.398 106.08 73.432 15.027 106.54 98.383 89.675 0.0511 0.78
earnings 1 (5.51) (8.89) (24.7) (11.25) (1.52) (28.82) (34.28) (43.36)
Consumer -28.441 44.929 76.194 139.25 -7.5958 410.16 6.971 639.74 0.0598 0.28
earnings 2 (-1.18) (1.8) (0.73) (2.79) (-0.12) (5.4) (0.06) (3.56)
Net capital 7.7293 0.5997 -17.552 3.8651 -1.5065 -1.7854 -6.7038 -8.6318 0.4029 0.30
export (1.30) (0.60) (-8.34) (0.79) (-0.20) (-1.22) (-4.05) (-4.26)
Y-production 0.4494 0.5101 0.3953 0.5212 0.6063 0.4631 0.3667 0.3607 0.8328 0.23
intensity (3.10) (8.81) (9.04) (7.11) (8.38) (10.80) (14.63) (28.16)
Large country
Unemploy- 0.3897 0.4396 0.4343 0.7527 0.6380 0.4877 0.3994 0.5468 0.0037 0.64
ment rate (6.29) (24.19) (6.26) (17.3) (10.44) (5.03) (8.11) (10.41)
Budget -0.1624 -0.1734 -0.0940 -0.6607 -0.6718 -0.1203 -0.1079 -0.2279 0.2287 0.59
surplus (-1.85) (-14.20) (-1.30) (-9.39) (-15.68) (-1.56) (-5.81) (-2.35)
Real GDP 139.395 121.514 127.353 54.584 86.164 110.274 134.281 100.287 0.0075 0.69
(15.19) (28.86) (19.05) (5.71) (9.71) (7.48) (38.12) (9.87)
Consumer 209.25 204.03 214.42 160.44 197.75 188.80 208.67 195.18 0.1288 0.96
earnings 1 (27.76) (42.23) (115.76) (12.8) (12.73) (29.86) (53.86) (33.09)
Consumer -604.52 -1363.38 -1180.43 -4484.74 -3140.44 -1728.07 -785.02 -2185.56 0.0355 0.40
earnings 2 (-1.07) (-8.84) (-1.77) (-9.16) (-6.31) (-1.89) (-3.89) (-3.41)
Net capital -7.7293 -0.5997 17.5523 -3.8651 1.5065 1.7854 6.7038 8.6318 0.4029 0.30
export (-1.30) (-0.60) (8.34) (-0.79) (0.20) (1.22) (4.05) (4.26)
Y-production 0.3902 0.5258 0.4023 0.5673 0.6441 0.5770 0.4514 0.6512 0.0006 0.85
intensity (19.08) (19.41) (25.33) (18.89) (12.04) (14.54) (20.7) (15.87)
Note: Prais-Winsten regressions that are corrected for rst-order serially-correlated residuals and robust standard errors, allowing
for dependent observations within sessions. a t-values in parentheses, b F-test testing the value of a2 against the value of b2;
all tests two-sided. `Unemployment rate' is dened as the amount of unemployed units of labor relative to the total labor force
(endowment) in the respective country; `Budget surplus' denotes the nominal budget surplus relative to nominal GDP (dened
as the total nominal value of the produced goods) in the respective country; the base `year' for calculating `Real GDP' is the
rst trading period in each session; `Consumer earnings 1' denotes average earnings of a consumer in points (`utility'); `Consumer
earnings 2' are `Consumer earnings 1' with the per capita budget surplus added; `Net capital export' is the dierence between
total capital sold to the other country and total capital bought from the other country; `Y-production intensity' denotes the total
amount of goods produced in the Y-sector relative to the total amount of goods produced in the respective country.
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9Result 2 By the end of the constant tax regime, all the economic performance indi-
cators, except for consumer earnings unadjusted for the budget surplus, show a mostly
signicant improvement for the small country under the STLS-system compared to the
WT-system. In the large country, where in both treatments the wage tax is applied to
nance unemployment benets, no such development is observed.
Note that these outcomes clearly contradict the expected eects of the STLS-system
presented at the beginning of the previous section. We turn now to the results of the
trading periods where the tax rates adjusted to the budget surplus in the previous
period: the variable tax regime. This enables us to investigate the robustness of our
ndings and, more specically, the economic impact of changes in the dierent taxes.
3.2 Variable Tax Regime
When the exogenous tax rates start to get adjusted to the budget surplus in the previous
trading period an economic shock occurs. This can be observed from the development
of the quantity variables shown in the panels (a) of Figures 2 and 3. From the former it
can be seen that all traded quantities in both countries decrease from period 8 to period
9, under the WT-system. Under the STLS-system the quantities traded internationally
and in the large country also decrease, but now the amount of local goods in the small
country increases, when the tax rates begin to adjust (Figure 3).
In the last constant tax period all economies with wage taxation are confronted with
substantial budget decits, whereas large surpluses are generated under the sales tax
system in the small country. Therefore, tax rates increase in the former and decrease
in the latter case (see Figure 5). As illustrated by the economic performance indicators
in Figures 4 and 6, this triggers a clearly observable negative economic shock, with
increasing unemployment rates and decreasing real GDP, in the economies with wage
taxation (i.e. both countries under the WT-system, and only the large country under
the STLS-system). Because of this shock, the budget balance does not improve in
the transition period 9 (see Figure 5). Thereafter, these economies seem to improve
somewhat, showing some convergence towards a balanced budget and a full utilization
of capital (see Figure 3). However, unemployment stays at a higher level, which has a
negative eect on outputs, as manifested by the development of real GDP in Figure 6.20
20Note, furthermore, that the gap between the values of the economic performance indicators in the
large country narrows over the periods with variable tax rates. We will return to this when presenting
the convergence analysis for the variable tax regime.
20Table 6 { Convergence regressions for variable tax regime
Economic performance indicators compared between the tax systems




Unemploy- 0.5972 0.5522 0.2282 0.3066 0.2378 0.2551 0.4729 0.2264 0.0165 0.63
ment rate (9.61)
a (12.73) (7.49) (16.20) (8.39) (5.86) (7.24) (8.09)
Budget -0.3972 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0186 -0.0253 -0.0078 -0.0356 0.0062 0.1698 0.62
surplus (-12.37) (0.00) (-0.02) (1.92) (-0.85) (-0.39) (-1.71) (0.41)
Real GDP 14.381 14.989 24.932 21.979 23.231 23.753 17.699 24.177 0.0310 0.72
(8.93) (9.96) (21.12) (24.45) (10.96) (11.69) (8.57) (22.38)
Consumer 81.931 84.767 76.938 87.830 80.752 103.334 95.376 93.540 0.7569 0.35
earnings 1 (16.94) (23.39) (8.01) (13.10) (9.37) (18.30) (30.43) (21.56)
Consumer -367.71 101.96 76.035 128.23 7.3062 99.196 50.433 105.19 0.1829 0.56
earnings 2 (-7.45) (1.39) (0.94) (9.12) (0.09) (2.98) (2.28) (4.10)
Net capital 5.5644 2.8271 -21.841 0.3272 -1.0861 -22.535 -4.4474 -20.716 0.0000 0.64
export (1.80) (1.49) (-6.77) (0.09) (-0.23) (-8.23) (-4.52) (-15.84)
Y-production 0.3060 0.4423 0.4588 0.4050 0.5061 0.5757 0.4018 0.4195 0.7812 0.58
intensity (32.13) (61.07) (12.93) (27.96) (10.44) (11.36) (15.85) (5.92)
Large country
Unemploy- 0.5543 0.4549 0.4663 0.7538 0.7381 0.7003 0.5015 0.6080 0.0903 0.70
ment rate (10.60) (11.96) (6.15) (13.61) (8.51) (11.16) (12.33) (10.78)
Budget -0.2185 -0.1219 -0.0106 -0.3717 -0.7370 - 0.3696 - 0.0572 -0.1493 0.1090 0.57
surplus (-7.26) (-2.37) (-0.32) (-5.66) (-8.51) (-10.61) (-1.57) (-2.71)
Real GDP 104.29 122.62 120.97 59.061 60.058 69.244 115.43 91.732 0.0716 0.55
(10.08) (17.90) (7.84) (4.93) (3.21) (5.07) (13.16) (8.11)
Consumer 200.40 208.51 207.74 181.82 174.60 181.04 203.45 194.39 0.0854 0.96
earnings 1 (38.52) (50.08) (43.37) (28.73) (24.25) (22.98) (63.08) (33.09)
Consumer -1680.7 -777.71 -156.14 -2534.6 -4356.0 -2380.6 -273.96 -1208.2 0.0934 0.42
earnings 2 (-17.79) (-2.33) (-1.48) (-9.12) (-17.53) (-8.89) (-0.71) (-2.38)
Net capital -5.5644 -2.8271 21.842 -0.3272 1.0861 22.535 4.4474 20.716 0.0000 0.64
export (-1.80) (-1.49) (6.77) (-0.09) (0.23) (8.23) (4.52) (15.84)
Y-production 0.4345 0.5071 0.4618 0.6358 0.6080 0.5591 0.4453 0.5549 0.0554 0.77
intensity (121.68) (27.23) (60.96) (85.21) (42.98) (36.81) (17.28) (17.63)
Note: Prais-Winsten regressions that are corrected for rst-order serially-correlated residuals and robust standard errors, allowing
for dependent observations within sessions. a t-values in parentheses, b F-test testing the value of a2 against the value of b2;
all tests two-sided. `Unemployment rate' is dened as the amount of unemployed units of labor relative to the total labor force
(endowment) in the respective country; `Budget surplus' denotes the nominal budget surplus relative to nominal GDP (dened
as the total nominal value of the produced goods) in the respective country; the base `year' for calculating `Real GDP' is the
rst trading period in each session; Consumer earnings 1' denotes average earnings of a consumer in points (`utility'); `Consumer
earnings 2' are `Consumer earnings 1' with the per capita budget surplus added; `Net capital export' is the dierence between
total capital sold to the other country and total capital bought from the other country; `Y-production intensity' denotes the total
amount of goods produced in the Y-sector relative to the total amount of goods produced in the respective country.
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1These developments in the economies where the wage tax system applies are in stark
contrast to the economic development in the small country under the alternative tax
system. First of all, the initial decline in the sales tax rates in period 9 produces positive
economic eects. This is witnessed by the development of the economic performance
indicators in Figures 4 and 6. The unemployment rate drops signicantly and real
GDP clearly increases. Note, furthermore, the positive eect on the wage rate, and the
negative eect on the price of the labor intensive good Y , in contrast to the development
under wage taxation (see Figures 2 and 3). The labor subsidy clearly seems to play
a role here. Remarkably, the budget immediately balances, and stays that way, with
only small deviations. As Figures 4 and 6 indicate, the unemployment rate and real
GDP further improve in later periods, and show convergence towards a level that is
substantially dierent from the level reached under the WT-system.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the convergence analysis regarding the
two tax systems for the variable tax regime. These results corroborate the above
observations.
Comparing the estimated asymptotic values a2 and b2, for the small country, a
signicant decrease in the unemployment rate and net capital export together with
a signicant increase in real GDP show up under the STLS-system. For the budget
surplus, the labor intensity of production, and both of the consumer earnings measures,
no signicant dierences are found. Observe, however, that consumer earnings adjusted
for the budget surplus show a considerable improvement, too. The outcome of no
signicant dierence in the development of the budget surplus is due to the convergence
towards a balanced budget under both tax systems when tax rates adjust.
Not surprisingly, for the large country, the outcomes are worse for the STLS-system
sessions, because of the bad start. Note, however, that none of the dierences between
the asymptotic values a2 and b2 are signicant at the 5 percent level, with the only
exception of net capital export that mirrors the result for the small country. This
pattern is in line with the observation from the gures indicating that the gap between
the values of the economic performance indicators for this country narrows over the
periods with variable tax rates. The following result summarizes.
Result 3 Under the variable tax regime, the positive view of the STLS-system as ob-
served for constant taxes is corroborated and enhanced. The economic performance of
the country where the STLS-system is applied further improves and shows a substan-
tially lower unemployment rate and net capital export, as well as a higher real GDP,
22compared to its performance under the WT-system. With respect to the other economic
indicators - the budget surplus, consumer earnings, and labor intensity of production -
there are no signicant dierences in performance.
Another way of looking at the economic impact of the tax systems is to investigate
the eects of changes in the dierent tax rates. Table 7 shows the results of regres-
sions concerning some real economic variables of interest: unemployment rate, capital
employment, real GDP, consumer welfare in terms of earnings, net capital export, and
Y -production intensity. In addition to the tax rates the number of the trading period
is included as independent variable to control for a linear trend.
Several observations are in order. First of all, the signs of all tax eects are quite
intuitive. For both the wage tax and the sales tax it appears that tax hikes have
a negative impact on the economic activity and consumer earnings of the country
directly involved. Higher taxes also encourages capital ight. The only ambiguous
eect concerns the labor intensity of production. Furthermore, a wage tax generally
has adverse eects on the economic variables in the respective country. This is witnessed
by the highly signicant coecients of the wage taxes ws in the small country and wl
in the large country, in most regressions. Interestingly, this is not the case for the sales
tax. Only the negative eect on capital employment is signicant at the 5 percent
level. Note, however, that the size of this adverse eect is much smaller for the sales
tax than for the wage tax. Interestingly, neither the unemployment rate nor real GDP
is signicantly aected by an increase in the sales tax. The next result summarizes.
Result 4 Compared to wage tax changes, increases in the sales tax appear to have a
much smaller adverse economic impact. Whereas an increase in the wage tax shows
a clearly detrimental eect on the employment of labor and real GDP, no signicant
eect is observed for the sales tax. Moreover, the negative eect of the sales tax on
capital is much weaker than that of the wage tax, while no eect on the labor intensity
of production is observed.
All in all, compared to the WT-system, the performance of the STLS-system turns out
to be remarkably good. None of the expectations regarding the economic indicators,
presented at the beginning of the previous section, nd support in the experimental
data. Incidentally, the results are even better than the ones suggested by the `favorable'
equilibrium of the theoretical benchmark model. For example, instead of the dreaded
capital ight, in fact capital import is observed (see Tables 5 and 6). In the next section
we oer a tentative explanation for this major nding, using some further evidence.
23Table 7 { The effect of taxes
on the performance of real economic variables
Unemployment Capital Consumer Net capital Y-production








(5.49) (-3.19) (-3.75) (-0.95) (4.56) (-2.14)
xs 0.0898 -9.7006
 -2.0667 -0.1446 12.000
 -0.0681
(1.23) (-2.79) (-0.94) (-0.03) (2.35) (-1.10)
wl -0.0444 1.5124 0.5829 -20.119
 -5.0507 0.0338
(-0.71) (0.13) (0.28) (-4.51) (-0.53) (1.01)
period -0.0071 0.8163 0.0878 1.1852
 -1.1439 0.0025







(3.06) (10.80) (8.15) (18.48) (-0.59) (8.68)
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
R
2 0.69 0.36 0.75 0.28 0.51 0.34
Large country
ws -0.0349 31.317
 13.021 7.0651 -26.529
 -0.0682
(-0.95) (8.78) (1.52) (1.22) (-4.56) (-1.56)
xs 0.1835 -18.511 -35.903 -13.395 -12.000
 0.1625







(8.18) (-4.88) (-7.80) (-5.08) (0.53) (0.60)
period -0.0058 1.3556 1.1607 0.7079 1.1439 -0.0001







(5.97) (10.98) (11.12) (38.46) (0.59) (12.57)
N 54 54 54 54 54 54
R
2 0.61 0.51 0.69 0.96 0.51 0.75
Note: Prais-Winsten regressions that are corrected for rst-order serially-correlated residuals and robust
standard errors, allowing for dependent observations within sessions; regressions are based on periods 8 to
16;  signicant at 1 percent,  signicant at 5 percent, and  signicant at 10 percent; a t-values in
parentheses, two-sided tests; `Unemployment rate' is dened as the amount of unemployed units of labor
relative to the total labor force (endowment) in the respective country; `Capital employment' denotes the
total amount of capital employed in the respective country; the base `year' for calculating `Real GDP' is the
rst trading period in each session; `Consumer earnings 1' denotes average earning of a consumer in points
(`utility'); `Net capital export' is the dierence between total capital sold to the other country and total
capital bought from the other country `Y-production intensity' denotes the total amount of goods produced
in the Y-sector relative to the total amount of goods produced in the respective country. Only one sales
tax rate appears in the regressions because of the xed ratio of the tax rates for the two production sectors
(see Table 1).
244 A behavioral explanation and empirical support
Our results suggest that nancing unemployment benets via sales taxes, in combi-
nation with a subsidy for employment, leads to much better economic outcomes than
using a wage tax, even in a relatively small open economy. Though disadvantaged at
the beginning, due to high tax rates stemming from persistent budget decits under the
wage tax system and the requirement of equivalent tax burdens on impact, the STLS-
system manifests its benecial eects immediately. Its better performance regarding
the economic indicators is even further improved when tax rates start to adjust to the
budget balance. Also, it appears that changes in sales taxes have a much weaker neg-
ative economic eect than changes in wage taxes. Since this result seems also to be at
odds with the prediction of the standard general equilibrium model, this requires an
explanation. Although, of course, the robustness of our results should be checked in
future experiments, theoretical and empirical support can be oered for the following
claim.
Claim 1 Uncertainty about product prices makes producers reluctant to incur produc-
tion costs. This can explain the good economic performance of the sales-tax-cum-labor-
subsidy system in comparison with the wage tax system. Instead of being confronted
with a tax burden up-front on the input of labor, producers under the former system
receive a labor subsidy and only have to pay taxes in proportion to their sales revenues,
which eectively means risk sharing by the government.
To substantiate this claim we oer four pieces of evidence. First, recall from Result 1
that under the constant wage tax regime quantity and input price variables typically
converge from below, whereas output prices seem to converge from above towards
the competitive equilibrium levels of the theoretical benchmark model. Although this
general equilibrium model does not capture the full complexity of the lab economy, the
result is suggestive of some downward pressure on the demand for inputs. Also, because
these outcomes are accompanied by a budget decit. A second piece of evidence in this
respect is obtained by comparing the (after tax) marginal revenue product of labor and
capital with the respective net (i.e. after tax or subsidy) input price. Table 8 shows the
number of cases in which producers' marginal revenue product exceeds the input price,
using average current prices.21 Assuming random errors, prot maximization would
be consistent with a fraction of 50%. The observed fractions are remarkably dierent,
however. Our next result summarizes the evidence.
21Similar results are obtained when the average product price of the previous period is used.
25Table 8 { Fraction of cases where producers'
marginal revenue product exceeds net input price
WT-system STLS-system
Labor Capital Labor Capital
Small country
1 to 8 0.4583 0.6250 0.6250 0.9583
(0.7646) (0.0557) (0.0557) (0.0000)
X-sector 9 to 16 0.5000 0.6667 0.8750 0.9583
(0.5573) (0.0147) (0.0000) (0.0000)
all 0.4792 0.6458 0.7500 0.9583
(0.6950) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0000)
1 to 8 0.5694 0.6944 0.4722 0.6528
(0.1444) (0.0007) (0.7220) (0.0064)
Y-sector 9 to 16 0.5833 0.8472 0.9167 0.6944
(0.0973) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007)
all 0.5764 0.7708 0.6944 0.6736
(0.0399) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Large country
1 to 8 0.6042 0.8333 0.9583 0.9583
(0.0967) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
X-sector 9 to 16 0.6250 0.7708 0.7708 1.0000
(0.0557) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
all 0.6146 0.8021 0.8646 0.9792
(0.0158) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
1 to 8 0.6250 0.6528 0.7361 0.5694
(0.0222) (0.0064) (0.0000) (0.1444)
Y-sector 9 to 16 0.6111 0.5972 0.5556 0.6944
(0.0382) (0.0625) (0.2048) (0.0007)
all 0.6181 0.6250 0.6458 0.6319
(0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.6319)
Note: Based on average current period input and output prices and all
periods; within parentheses the probability of obtaining values as least
as extreme as observed when p = 0:5; binomial test, one-sided.
Result 5 Averaging over periods and tax systems, for about 70 percent of the cases
producers' marginal revenue product of capital and labor exceeds the input price. Taken
over all periods, with only one exception in each system, the excess is always signicant.
Moreover, comparing the second half of the trading periods with the rst half, there is
no systematic decrease in the excess.
This result provides further support for the view that, under both tax systems, produc-
ers are reluctant to buy inputs.22 Interestingly, Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995)
22In particular, because we have no evidence of a shortage of capital or labor. On the contrary,
comparing actual labor supply with theoretical labor supply - using the benchmark model and actual
26observe a similar phenomenon in an experiment concerning international trade.23 They
conjecture that producers may require a compensation for the market risk they run,
since they may not be able to sell outputs. The underlying reason may be some form
of aversion towards risk or losses. Indeed, partial equilibrium models exist indicating
that product price uncertainty reduces the factor demand of risk-averse competitive
rms (see the literature mentioned in the Introduction). And risk-averse behavior of
rms appears to be a realistic assumption.24 Empirical microeconomic studies of the
consequences of market uncertainty for factor demand are scarce, though (see Ghosal
(1995)).25 Important exceptions are Leahy and Whited (1996) and Guiso and Parigi
(1999). Both of these studies nd that investment is negatively aected by uncertainty.
Guiso and Parigi note that eld empirical research in this area is plagued by the ab-
sence of data and measurement problems. Experiments like ours may be helpful in this
respect.
Taking the standard deviation of transaction prices in the previous period as mea-
sure of expected price uncertainty in the current period, we examine the correlation of
this measure with the employment of capital and labor. Table 9 presents the outcomes.
In line with the eld studies, a mostly signicant negative correlation shows up. The
next result summarizes this third piece of evidence for our claim.
Result 6 The demand for capital and labor is mostly signicantly negatively correlated
with output price uncertainty.
What causes risk averse behavior is not completely clear yet. Recent studies on the
economic signicance of emotions suggest that anxiety may play a role, because of the
time lag between inputs and outputs (cf. the motto of our paper). For example, Caplin
and Leahy (2001) argue that by ignoring anxiety conventional measures of risk aversion
prices - we nd excess supply for a fraction of the consumers that is signicantly larger than 50% (on
average, 94% for the WT-system and 73% for the STLS-system). Concerning capital, the relatively
low capital price also points into the direction of an excess supply (see Figures 2 and 3).
23Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995) use simultaneous (double auction) input and output markets.
Thus, our results do not seem to be due to the use of sequential markets. Hey and di Cagno (1998),
investigating experimentally two sequential double auction markets, also observe a shortage of trade,
compared to the competitive equilibrium predictions.
24According to Stiglitz (1999, p. 254): \There is by now a large body of literature arguing that
normally rms act in a risk averse manner (...)". Zhang (1998, p. 1753) notes: \Investors of all types
generally exhibit aversion to risk". For an empirical study showing risk-aversion by rms, see Gunjal
and Legault (1995).
25The situation is dierent for studies focusing on the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty, as
captured by ination, for instance. These studies typically show a negative eect on private investment
(see Aizenman and Marion 1993, Brunetti and Weder 1998).
27Table 9 { Correlation of factor employment
and output price uncertainty
St.dev. output price St.dev. output price
WT-system STLS-system WT-system STLS-system
Lys -0.0868 -0.3490 Kys -0.0056 -0.3390
(0.5709) (0.0188) (0.9711) (0.0227)
Lyl -0.3198 -0.4796 Kyl -0.3251 0.2455
(0.0322) (0.0009) (0.0293) (0.1041)
Lxs -0.3195 -0.5016 Kxs -0.3004 -0.6194
(0.0324) (0.0004) (0.0450) (0.0000)
Lxl -0.2721 -0.6669 Kxl 0.0737 -0.5833
(0.0706) (0.0000) (0.6304) (0.0000)
Lx -0.2828 -0.6565 Kx -0.0523 -0.6567
(0.0598) (0.0000) (0.7331) (0.0000)
Note: Entries show Spearman's  between employment of the mentioned
factor in period t and the standard deviation of the relevant nominal output
price in period t   1; p-values in parentheses, two-sided tests.
underestimate the eects of uncertainty on asset prices. The reason is that because
anxiety is aversive it requires compensation by a higher rate of return. Consequently, an
anxious decision maker may appear more risk averse.26 Another relevant nding in this
context is that the possibility rather than the probability of a negative outcome appears
to be important (Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch (2001)), which manifests itself
in overreaction to small probability events (see Harless and Camerer 1994). In the
context of sequential markets it is also interesting that people also seem to treat delayed
outcomes as being uncertain (see Keren and Roelofsma (1995)). These results do not
only provide additional support for our result of a negative eect of price uncertainty
on factor demand, they also indicate that little perceived uncertainty may already
have substantial eects. Thus, it need not be surprising if we do not observe rapid
convergence to competitive equilibrium levels in complex market environments. To
improve theoretical predictions it seems important to take the so far neglected dynamic
behavioral aspects of such market economies into account. A research direction which
is strongly advocated by Akerlof (2002).
For our fourth and nal piece of evidence we return to Table 7. This table shows
that increases in the sales tax have much weaker adverse economic eects than increases
in the wage tax. This nding ts the view that producers are relatively more concerned
26Experimental evidence of a negative impact of anxiety on risk taking is presented in Bosman and
van Winden (2002).
28with incurring certain costs up-front than with some uncertain costs, that can be shared
with the government, in the future.
All in all, the theoretical and empirical support for our claim seems substantial.
The evidence presented makes it quite intuitive why the sales tax system performs so
much better than the wage tax system. With any aversion to risk or losses, having
the government share in the sales revenue risk, instead of having to bear a tax burden
up-front, certainly seems to be the more producer and employment friendly scheme.
The more so when a labor subsidy is included.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present an experimental comparison of a wage tax system and an
alternative sales-tax-cum-labor-subsidy system as a means of nancing unemployment
benets. Our experimental results are strongly in favor of the alternative system. None
of the worries and expectations that were ventilated by policymakers and economic
policy advisers regarding the alternative tax system nd support. Employment and
GDP does not decline but sharply increased. Instead of capital ight, capital import is
observed. The balance of the budget does not deteriorate but strongly improves, and
no shift towards labor-intensive production occurs.
This calls for an explanation. In our view, producers' reluctance to incur production
costs up-front when facing product price uncertainty plays a crucial role. We present
four pieces of experimental evidence in support of this claim. First, a convergence
analysis using the results of the theoretical benchmark model appears to be suggestive
of a downward pressure on the demand for inputs. Quantity and input price variables
typically converge from below, and output price variables from above the theoretically
predicted levels. Second, for most producers the estimated marginal revenue product
of capital and labor persistently exceeds the respective input price. Third, the demand
for capital and labor turns out to be mostly negatively correlated with the variance of
output transaction prices in the previous trading period. Finally, we nd that increases
in sales tax rates have much weaker adverse economic eects than increases in wage tax
rates. This evidence makes it understandable that the alternative tax system performs
much better than the wage tax system. Instead of having to pay an input tax up-front,
producers receive a labor subsidy while they only have to pay taxes in proportion to
whatever the sales revenues turn out to be. The latter eectively means risk sharing
29by the government. Furthermore, our claim nds support from some theoretical partial
equilibrium models showing that risk-averse rms indeed employ fewer inputs.
Although, as yet, relatively few macroeconomic experiments have been carried out,
we think that the experience that is now accumulating is of interest from a scientic
as well as policy perspective. For example, our experimental ndings are in agreement
with Akerlof's view that macroeconomics should be behavioral, in the spirit of Keynes
(see Akerlof (2002, p. 428)). An aversion on the side of producers to input taxation
relative to output taxation, due to the elapse of time, is a behavioral factor that seems
to have been neglected in theory. In fact, this nding may have a wider bearing on
the theoretical modeling of how economic agents behave in complex dynamic market
environments. As noted by Plott (2001): \as it turns out, the classical theories of price
adjustment are incomplete" (p. 3), and \experiments teach us about theory and it is
theory that we use when addressing complex and new problems. The progress builds
in slow and in unexpected ways" (p. 27).
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